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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how wage decisions and fixed asset investments are 
determined under China’s imperfect financial market. In addition, we also investigate what kind of 
interrelationship exists between wage determination and fixed asset investment. To test the 
hypothesis, we collect aggregate data on wages, the financial market, and fixed asset investment by 
province, sector, and ownership type from several statistical yearbooks. The main results are (1) 
while the rise in financial market maturity has led to rising wage levels for state-owned enterprises, 
this phenomenon is not observed in the private sector, (2) retained earnings are positively correlated 
with capital investment, indicating that China’s financial market is incomplete. Furthermore, in the 
private sector, there is a strong reliance on internal reserves that is not observed in the state-owned 
sector, suggesting that the private sector is differentially treated in the financial market. (3) In the 
state-owned sector, wage growth has a positive correlation with fixed assets, while in the 
nonstate-owned sector this relationship is not observed. This implies that in the nonstate-owned 
sector the underpayment of wages may be used as a survival strategy to conduct business if under 
financial constraints. 
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1. Introduction 
The Chinese economy has achieved high economic growth since its reform and opening policy 
began in 1978. According to the China Statistical Yearbook, China’s average per capita growth rate 
of gross domestic product (GDP) was 8.6% between 1978 and 2017. Thus, it is no exaggeration to 
say that China has experienced a miracle in terms of its economic growth. As a result, living 
standards have risen dramatically. For example, compared with 1978, real household consumption 
expenditure in 2017 had increased by a factor of 11 and 13 in urban and rural areas, respectively. 
Over the same period, the real per capita disposable income of households increased 15 times for 
urban households and more than 18 times for rural households. In addition, the industrial structure 
has changed significantly over the last 40 years, in line with the trends experienced by developed 
countries. In 1978, primary industry accounted for 27.7% of GDP, secondary industry accounted for 
47.7%, the tertiary industry accounted for only 24.6%. By 2017, in contrast, tertiary industry 
accounted for 51.6% of GDP and primary industry accounted for less than 8%. 
However, China’s rapid economic growth path has resulted in certain distinctive economic 
features. First, China’s financial markets remain immature (Allen et al., 2005). In particular, 
although the state-owned sector can easily obtain loans, the private sector is often discriminated 
against and finds it difficult to obtain loans (Knight and Ding, 2010, Poncet et al., 2010, Guariglia et 
al., 2011). As shown in Figure 1, domestic loans as a proportion of total investment financing were 
20% in 1995 but by 2017 had fallen to 11%; and self-financing, which accounted for 52% of total 
investment financing in 1995, had risen to almost 70% by 2017. Furthermore, self-financing and 
“other sources” together accounted for 82% of investment financing in 2017, implying that Chinese 
corporations are not financing their investments using financial markets, but are relying heavily on 
internal reserves for fixed capital investments. 
The second distinctive feature arising from China’s rapid economic growth path is that fixed 
asset investment is very strong. Many studies have argued that China’s economic growth is not due 
to total factor productivity growth but rather to external growth, supported by investment in factors 
such as capital (Islam et al., 2006, Zheng and Hu, 2006, Zheng et al., 2009). As Figure 2 shows, at 
the beginning of the economic reform period, household consumption accounted for only 48% of 
GDP. This proportion was already lower than that in developed countries, yet it has declined since 
the 1990s and even more sharply after the 2000s. Meanwhile, gross capital formation has been 
strong until recently. In particular, the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP has exceeded 
household consumption since 2004, indicating the possibility of an extensive growth pattern 
supported by capital investment. Not only does the state-owned sector maintain high capital 
investment levels, but private enterprises are also experiencing rapid capital formation. In Figure 3, 
the bar graph represents fixed asset investment in the state and nonstate sectors. The line shows the 
investment ratio in the state-owned/nonstate-owned sectors. Since 2001, the amount of fixed asset 
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investment in the nonstate-owned sector has exceeded that in the state-owned sector. In recent years, 
fixed asset investment in the state-owned sector has been less than 30% of that in the 
nonstate-owned sector. An empirical study conducted by Ding et al. (2019) showed that 
overinvestment is observed for all types of firms, even in the most efficient and profitable private 
sectors in China. However, this phenomenon is paradoxical when the financial market is imperfect. 
If the private sector finds financing difficult to obtain because of the imperfect market, capital 
investment will be restricted and high levels of investment will be not realized. In conjunction with 
the capital investment shifts, the labor force allocation has changed greatly between business units 
based on their ownership types. For example, in 1990, state-owned units were responsible for 60.7% 
of employment in urban areas (if collective-owned units are included, this percentage rises to 81.5%). 
Thereafter, however, the share declined, such that by 2017, state-owned units employed only 14.3% 
of the urban labor market (or 15.2% if urban collective-owned units are included), indicating that the 
private sector was becoming the main employer in urban China (Figure 4).  
The third distinctive feature of Chinese economic growth is that the labor market is far from 
being in a state of perfect competition and remains immature, as evidenced by low wages for 
employees and the fact that wage growth has not kept pace with economic growth. For instance, 
Fleisher and Wang (2004), Fleisher et al. (2011), and Dong and Putterman (1996, 2000, 2002) 
investigated the underpayment of labor wages in China. The share of employees’ compensation in 
GDP in China is lower than that in developed countries, and it has been declining rapidly since the 
2000s (Figure 5). The lowest share recorded was only 47% in 2011. Figure 6 plots the real wage 
from 1994 to 2015, comparing the ratio between state-owned, collective-owned, and “other 
ownership” business units. Until 2002, the real wage of “other ownership” units was about 1.4 to 1.1, 
exceeding the wage level of the state-owned units. However, since 2005, the state-owned units have 
surpassed the others. The real wage level of collective-owned units is still only 80% of that of 
state-owned units. In other words, wage gaps are observed according to ownership, and the 
state-owned sector enjoys higher wages than the nonstate-owned sector (Zhao, 2002). 
The main hypothesis of this paper is that in a situation where private enterprises are unable to 
obtain loans in an imperfect financial market, as a survival strategy they have created capital 
investment funds by underpaying wages and using the money saved for capital investment. We 
combine the imperfection of financial and labor markets into one fixed capital investment equation 
to investigate the interrelationship between wage determination and fixed asset investment. To our 
knowledge, ours is the first study of the interrelationship between wage determination and fixed 
asset investment in an imperfect financial market in China using unique merged provincial data. 
To test our hypothesis, we collected aggregate data on labor wages, the financial market, and 
fixed asset investment at the province level and by ownership type from several statistical yearbooks. 
The main findings are as follows. First, although the increase in financial market maturity has led to 
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rising wage levels for state-owned enterprises, this phenomenon is not observed in the private sector. 
Second, retained earnings are positively correlated with capital investment, indicating that China’s 
financial market is incomplete. Furthermore, in the private sector, there is a strong reliance on 
internal reserves that is not observed in the state-owned sector, suggesting that the private sector is 
treated differently in financial markets. Third, in addition to examining the financial market situation, 
we undertook an estimation that includes previous wage growth in the fixed asset investment 
equation. In the state-owned sector, wage growth is positively correlated with fixed assets, whereas 
in the nonstate-owned sector, this relationship is not observed. This implies that the underpayment of 
wages may be a survival strategy for the nonstate-owned sector if the firms in this sector are 
operating under financial constraints in conducting their business. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature 
review and Section 3 explains the data sources and regression variables. Section 4 presents the 
estimation models and Section 5 discusses the regression results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
Many empirical studies have found that corporations face borrowing constraints under 
imperfect financial markets, which therefore hinder corporate growth (Stein, 2003 and Hubbard, 
1998). Whited (1992) developed a dynamic model of finance and investment and tested a firm’s 
optimal investment Euler equation. She found that including the effect of a debt constraint greatly 
improves the Euler equation’s performance compared with the standard specification, and that the 
allocation of real investment expenditure over time will be affected when firms face the financing 
constraint. Bond and Meghir (1994) extended the standard neoclassical model of capital 
accumulation to include adjustment costs, where the firm faces a hierarchy of costs for alternative 
sources of finance. They used data on UK manufacturing companies to estimate the investment 
Euler equation, and claimed that current investment is positively related to lagged cash flow when 
firms are liquidity constrained. Others, including Allayannis and Muzomdar (2004), Fazzari et al. 
(2000), and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005), have used investment cash flow 
sensitivity as an indicator of credit constraints to investigate firms’ fixed capital investments in 
imperfect financial markets. 
Further, Love (2003) studied the effect of financial development on firms’ investment via their 
ability to obtain external finance. Love found that small firms are disproportionately more 
disadvantaged in less financially developed countries than are large firms. Harrison et al. (2004) 
examined the impact of global capital flows (foreign direct investment) on host-country firms’ 
financing constraints. They found that foreign direct investment is associated with a reduction in 
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financing constraints. Other studies investigating capital market imperfections and firm investments 
in transition and developing economies include those by Konings, Rizov, and Vandenbussche (2003), 
Lizal and Svejnar (2002), and Harrison and McMillan (2003). 
In regard to the Chinese economy, Barnett and Brooks (2006) and Knight and Ding (2010) 
showed the importance of retained earnings and informal funds to Chinese enterprises by analyzing 
aggregated data. A number of studies have adopted a micro perspective and used firm-level data to 
study firms’ capital investment behavior under imperfect financial markets. Ayyagari et al. (2010) 
used the World Bank Investment Climate Survey dataset and concluded that a relatively small 
percentage of firms in their sample obtained financing through the formal bank system, with the 
majority relying strongly on informal finance. Chow and Fung (1998) investigated the relationship 
between investment and cash flow using panel data on manufacturing firms operating in Shanghai. 
They found that firms’ investments are constrained by cash flow, and that the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow is highest for private firms and lowest for foreign-owned firms. Using panel 
data on Chinese firms, Guariglia et al. (2011) found evidence of discrimination in access to credit for 
private-sector firms. Poncet et al. (2010) used firm-level data for China from the Oriana data set and 
found that private Chinese firms depend more on internally generated funds for their investments 
than do state-owned firms, and that they appear to be more credit constrained, which impedes their 
growth. 
Compared with the vast body of research on the relationship between financial frictions and 
firm-level investment, the literature linking imperfect financial markets with labor markets is sparser 
(Michaels, Page, and Whited, 2018). Michelacci and Quadrini (2005, 2009) built a long-term 
contract model to analyze how the financial conditions of the firm affect the compensation structure 
of workers, the size of the firm, and its dynamics. They found that firms offer long-term wage 
contracts when they are financially constrained. Thus, employees receive an increasing wage profile, 
in terms of lower wages today in exchange for higher future wages. Therefore, firms can effectively 
borrow from their employees to overcome their borrowing constraints. Their model predicted that 
younger and smaller firms will grow faster and pay lower wages. Using matched employer–
employee data from Finland and the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, Michelacci and 
Quadrini (2009) showed that the data support the key dynamic properties of their model. 
Pagano and Pica (2012) offered a simple model to explore the ways in which financial 
development can be expected to affect employment, wages, and the reallocation of jobs. Their model 
showed that although in normal times, financial development may foster output and employment 
growth, in a crisis it may exacerbate their contraction. In the empirical part of their study, they used 
international industry-level data for 1970–2003 and found that standard measures of financial 
development are indeed associated with greater employment growth and that the development of the 
financial market correlates negatively with the interindustry dispersion of employment growth. 
6 
 
Furthermore, they found some evidence of a “dark side” of financial development, that is, during 
banking crises, employment grows less in the industries that are more dependent on external finance 
and those located in the more financially developed countries. 
Another closely related paper is by Michaels, Page, and Whited (2015). These authors 
attempted to explain how employment, wage setting, and financial frictions interact, and in particular 
how firms’ financial decisions spill over to affect wage determination. They assembled a new, 
quarterly panel data set that links US firms’ investment and financing decisions to their employment 
and wages. In their empirical exercise, they found a strong negative relation between leverage and 
average labor earnings, both in the cross-section and within firms, and the sensitivity was larger for 
firms likely to face financial constraints. Then, they constructed a dynamic model of labor and 
capital demand in the face of financial frictions to explain the mechanisms behind the empirical 
results. The main mechanism derived from their model was that firms bargain with workers and 
exploit higher leverage as a means to restrain wages, which induces a quantitatively relevant 
negative relation between leverage and labor earnings. 
There are several papers that focus on the impact of financial frictions on labor markets during 
a financial shock. Chodorow-Reich (2014) and Duygan-Bump, Levkov, and Montoriol-Garriga 
(2015) analyzed the enormous increase in job loss immediately following the failure caused by the 
Lehman shock in 2008. Meanwhile, Cantor (1990), Sharpe (1994), Matsa (2010), Bakke and Whited 
(2012), Benmelech, Bergman, and Enriquez (2012), and Agrawal and Matsa (2013) demonstrated 
that financing frictions affect labor demand and wage setting in normal times, not just during 
extreme credit market failures. 
There is already a huge amount of academic research on the Chinese labor market and wages. 
Yang et al. (2010) used macro data from multiple sources to examine changes in Chinese labor 
wages during the period 1978–2007. Ge and Yang (2011) discussed the “Lewis turning point” in the 
Chinese labor market in recent years, using two different economic theories. Ge and Yang (2014) 
used the unique Urban Household Surveys microdata to examine changes in the wage structure in 
the rapidly developing Chinese labor market. Other well-regarded studies include those by Démurger, 
Li, and Yang (2012), Lee (2012), and Zhu (2016). However, there are comparatively few discussions 
about the relationship between imperfect financial markets and labor payments. Shao, Bao, and Ye 
(2013) examined the causal effect of firms’ financial constraints on labor income based on a World 
Bank enterprise survey on Chinese manufacturing firms. Their main finding was that firms subject to 
greater borrowing constraints tended to pay lower wages to their employees. A closely related paper 
by Lin and Zhao (2015) investigated the influence of financial stress on the labor share of income. 
Their empirical results showed that financial stress significantly suppressed this share for nonstate 
and nonforeign firms, implying the existence of “ownership discrimination” in the Chinese economy. 
Furthermore, they found that the negative impact was more severe for smaller firms and for firms in 
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traditional manufacturing sectors, indicating the possibility of both “scale discrimination” and 
“sector discrimination”. 
 
 
3. Data 
For our exercise, we require information on financial markets, fixed capital investments, and 
the labor market. To test the hypothesis discussed above, we collected data from several statistical 
yearbooks, the “Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking”, the “Statistical Yearbook of the Chinese 
Investment in Fixed Assets”, the “China Labor Statistical Yearbook”, the “China Industry Statistical 
Yearbook”, and the “China Statistical Yearbook”. All data are aggregate data at the provincial level. 
To examine the effects of ownership, we collected data from three categories of business units based 
on ownership: the state-owned sector, the collective sector, and the “other ownership” sector.Details 
on how we collected and defined the variables are provided below. 
 
3.1.Labor wage 
The average wage index includes the average wages of employees and of incumbent 
employees. This paper uses the average wage of incumbent employees. In the “China Labor 
Statistics Yearbook”, ownership is classified into the state-owned sector, the collective sector, and 
the “other” sector. To investigate wage decisions in the private sector, we collected average wage 
data for employees of private enterprises for 2009 to 2015 from the “China Statistical Yearbook”. All 
average wages were nominal variables, which we converted into real terms using the provincial-level 
urban consumer price index, with 2000 as the base year. 
 
3.2.Fixed asset investment 
Fixed asset investment data were extracted mainly from the “Statistical Yearbook of the 
Chinese Investment in Fixed Assets”. We collected aggregate data by ownership at the provincial 
level. However, data were not available for 2014 because the 2014 “Statistical Yearbook of the 
Chinese Investment in Fixed Assets” has not been published. Thus, we used the 2013 data 
supplemented by the “China Statistical Yearbook”. Fixed asset investment was converted into real 
terms using the provincial fixed asset investment price index, with 2000 as the base year. 
 
3.3.Financial market development 
For variables representing the development status of China’s financial markets, we collected 
statistical data from the “Almanac of China's Finance and Banking”, the “Statistical Yearbook of the 
Chinese Investment in Fixed Assets”, the “China Industry Statistical Yearbook”, and the “China 
Statistical Yearbook”. 
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Three sets of variables are used in this paper to represent imperfections in financial markets. 
First, the main economic indicators of industrial enterprises are recorded in the “China Industry 
Statistical Yearbook”, including interest expenditure, which indicates interest payments for loan 
funds. If this variable is large, we consider that dependence on external funds is high. To control for 
the scale of production in considering ease of access to the financial market, we use interest 
expenditure/sales for the estimation. In addition, the “China Industry Statistical Yearbook” has a 
statistical table for each type of company ownership, separated according to the state-, collective-, 
and private-owned sectors, and total ownership. 
Next, the “Statistical Yearbook of the Chinese Investment in Fixed Assets” has data on the 
financing sources of capital investment funds. In this paper, we use self-procured funds/total 
investment funds and self-funds/total investment funds for the estimation. If the proportion of 
self-raised funds and self-funded investments is large, it indicates that firms find it more difficult to 
access financial markets. Therefore, internal funds or funds raised through routes other than financial 
markets are more important for capital investment. 
In addition, some major economic and financial statistics for provinces recorded in the 
“Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking” show the development status of financial markets in the 
region. For our research, we extracted the deposit balances and loan amounts of all financial 
institutions to develop an index of financial market maturity. In addition, to control for the 
production scale, the variables are divided by the provincial GDP. Thus, we use the deposit balance 
of financial institutions/GDP and loan amount of financial institutions/GDP in the estimation 
exercise. 
 
3.4.Other control variables 
To capture the influence of factors other than the financial indicators on wage determination 
and fixed capital investment, we add three further control variables in this exercise: the total 
profit/sales value of industry (profit), the natural logarithm of real fixed assets/the number of 
enterprise units (fixed assets), and the total liabilities/total assets (liabilities). All data were collected 
from the “China Industry Statistical Yearbook”. Table 1 reports the selected descriptive statistics. 
 
 
4. Estimation models 
4.1.Fixed effects model (level and first-differenced) 
We estimate two fixed effects regression models, one based on level variables and the other on 
growth variables, using the first difference of the natural logarithm, respectively, as follows: 
 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜸𝜸′𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 .     (1) 
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 ∆𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛾𝛾∆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜸𝜸′𝜟𝜟𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 .     (2) 
 
Subscript 𝑖𝑖 indicates the province and 𝑡𝑡 is the time index. 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 is a year dummy that 
controls time fixed effects, 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 is province-specific effects, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term. 
The growth of variables (the first difference of the natural logarithm) is represented by ∆. 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the real wage or real fixed asset investment at the provincial 
level and 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 are financial indicators. We collected five indicators: interest expense/sales value of 
industry (interest), self-raised funds/total of sources of funds (self-raised), own funds/total of sources 
of funds (own funds), total deposits/GDP (deposits), and total loans/GDP (loans). 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 are control 
variables, as discussed above. 
 
4.2.Generalized method of moments estimation (dynamic panel data) 
Next, a dynamic panel is introduced to consider the dynamic environment. We adopt a 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation, which has been applied widely in recent years, 
especially in the literature evaluating the impact of financial development on economic growth. As 
the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the fixed effects in the error term, inconsistent 
estimators may be produced: a problem known as “dynamic panel bias” (Nickell, 1981). Further, 
financial indicators and control variables may be correlated with idiosyncratic error terms, resulting 
in an endogeneity problem. To address these issues, the GMM panel estimators use lagged 
observations of the explanatory variables as instruments (internal instruments). Therefore, we can 
reliably investigate the impact of the exogenous component of financial development on wage or 
fixed capital investment growth in China. 
 
4.2.1. The first-differenced GMM estimators 
Consider the following regression equation: 
 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝜌𝜌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜸𝜸′𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡.    (3) 
 
As 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 is correlated with the lagged dependent variable 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1, the within-group estimators are 
inconsistent, even if 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is not serially correlated. Taking the first difference of Eq. (3), we obtain: 
 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝜌𝜌�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2�+ 𝛽𝛽�𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1�+ 𝜸𝜸′�𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1�+ (𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1) +�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1�.        (4) 
According to Eq. (4), there are two kinds of endogenous issues that need to be instrumented: 
first, the endogeneity of the regressors (the financial indicators and control variables), and second, 
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the correlation between 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2 in Eq. (4). 
For the first-differenced GMM estimators, the following moment conditions are introduced: 
 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1�� = 0, for s ≥ 2; 𝑡𝑡 = 3,… ,𝑇𝑇, 𝐸𝐸�𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1�� = 0, for s ≥ 2; 𝑡𝑡 = 3,… ,𝑇𝑇,    (5) 𝐸𝐸�𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1�� = 0, for s ≥ 2; 𝑡𝑡 = 3,… ,𝑇𝑇. 
 
Therefore, the twice and further lagged explanatory variables are used as the instrumental 
variables. 
 
4.2.2. The system GMM estimators 
As Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1996) and Blundell and Bond (1998) mentioned, the 
instruments available for the first difference equation are weak instruments when the explanatory 
variables are close to a random walk, because past levels convey little information about future 
changes. Weak instruments can result in serious finite sample biases. To solve the potential bias of 
the first-differenced GMM estimators, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
introduced a system involving an equation expressed in levels combined with an equation in 
differences. The idea is that the past changes may indeed be more predictive of current levels than 
past levels are of current changes for random walk-like variables, so that the new instruments are 
more relevant. By estimating these two equations simultaneously, we obtain the so-called system 
GMM estimators. The moment conditions for the equation expressed in levels are as follows: 
 𝐸𝐸��𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠−𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠−1��𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�� = 0, for s = 1; 𝑡𝑡 = 3,… ,𝑇𝑇, 𝐸𝐸��𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠−𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠−1��𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�� = 0, for s = 1; 𝑡𝑡 = 3,… ,𝑇𝑇,   (6) 𝐸𝐸��𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠−𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠−1��𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�� = 0, for s = 1; 𝑡𝑡 = 3,… ,𝑇𝑇, 
 
which confirm the additional assumption that the first differences of the independent variables are 
uncorrelated with the province-specific effects 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖. Therefore, the first lagged differences of 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠, 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠, and 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠 are used as additional instruments. 
 
4.2.3. Techniques for reducing the issue of ‘‘too many instruments’’ 
When adopting the GMM estimation, the problem of “too many instruments” arises. The 
number of instruments grows easily when there is an increase in the time period 𝑇𝑇 or in the 
explanatory variables. As noted by Roodman (2009), Windmeijer (2005), and Arellano (2002), 
among others, a large instrument collection that overfits endogenous variables may lead to biased 
estimators, even as it weakens the Hansen test of the instruments’ joint validity. To avoid this issue 
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of too many instruments, we follow the techniques applied by Roodman (2009). First, we limit the 
lags for instruments to only one or two, instead of all available lags, so the instrument count is linear 
in 𝑇𝑇. Second, we collapse instruments into smaller sets. We follow the suggestion of Roodman 
(2009) in using both approaches to reduce the instrument count1. 
 
 
5. Estimated result 
Below, we report the results of the estimation. We first discuss the effects of financial 
development on wage determination, then verify the impact of financial circumstances on fixed 
capital investment. Finally, we investigate the interrelationship between wage determination and 
fixed asset investment in the imperfect financial market. 
 
5.1.The effects of financial development on wage determination 
Table 2-1 reports the fixed effect estimation results 2 . Interest indicates the interest 
expense/sales value of industry, with a higher value indicating that more interest must be paid. In 
China, the financial institutions treat state-sector and nonstate-sector enterprises differently. In 
particular, financial institutions lend funds to the state sector more actively and cheaply, which 
means that the state sector pays more interest to the commercial banks than do the nonstate sector 
institutions, which take out fewer bank loans. Therefore, we expect that the coefficient on interest 
will be positive in the state sector, whereas in the nonstate sector, it will be insignificant or negative. 
The results in Table 2-1 regarding the state sector confirm our prediction, as the coefficient of ∆ 
interest is estimated to be significant and positive, meaning that easier access to financial markets 
has a positive impact on wage payments. Table 2-2 reports the GMM estimation results3. We find the 
same result: the first-differenced GMM, interest is positive and significant only for the state sector. 
After it formally entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, China accelerated the reform 
of its financial markets, including undertaking more interest rate liberalization, removing restrictions 
on ownership takeovers, and offering greater freedom to foreign banks. The Chinese government 
pledged to remove banking regulations by 2006 (Zhang et al., 2012). Thus, by separately examining 
the data from 2007 onwards, we test the effect of financial development on wage determination in a 
relatively competitive financial market. Table 2-3 reports the GMM estimation results. As the table 
shows, our estimates for deposits and loans were significant and positive in the system GMM 
                                                     
1
 Previous papers that adopted this technique include Levine et al. (2000), Giedeman and Compton 
(2009), Demir and Dahi (2009), and Zhang et al. (2012). 
2
 To save space, we report only the main estimated results of the parameters of interest. 
3
 We limit our estimation to three lags for every explanatory variable and use the “collapse 
technique” to avoiding the too many instruments problem when conducting the GMM exercise in 
this paper. 
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estimation, indicating that the state sector has been favored by the financial markets following the 
liberalization from 2007 onwards. The evidence reveals that the state sector enjoys better access to 
financial markets and that, as a result, it can pay higher wages to employees. In contrast, the 
nonstate-owned sectors that are discriminated against in financial markets find it difficult to obtain 
finance and this has a negative impact on employee wage payments. 
 
5.2.The impact of financial circumstances on fixed capital investment 
Table 3-1 reports the estimation results from the fixed effects model regarding the impact of 
interest expenses on fixed asset investments. We find that in the state sector, the estimated coefficient 
of interest expenses is 9.431 for the level model. The coefficient is estimated to be significantly 
negative in the “other ownership” and private sectors, and its magnitude is two times larger in 
absolute value than the coefficient in the state sector4. Table 3-2 shows the estimation results of the 
fixed effects model for the impact of self-raised funds on fixed asset investments. The results show 
that only the state sector loses significance in the level estimation. The total province, urban areas, 
collective enterprises, the “other ownership” sector, and private enterprises all have significantly 
positive estimates. 
Next, we discuss the GMM estimation results, which—given the endogeneity issues noted 
above—provide a more appropriate estimation. Table 3-3 reports the estimation results of the GMM 
estimation for the impact of interest expenses on fixed asset investments. Almost all the estimators 
lose their significance compared with the results of the fixed effects model. However, in the private 
sector, the interest expense is significantly negative in the first-differenced GMM and is estimated at 
–26.288, greater than in the fixed effects model. Table 3-4 shows the GMM estimation results for the 
impact of self-raised funds on fixed asset investments. With the exception of the collective-owned 
sector, the GMM estimation confirms that the results are significant and positive for the total 
province, urban areas, the “other ownership” sector, and private enterprises. In the state sector, we 
even find that the coefficient of self-raised funds is significantly negative in the first-differenced 
GMM estimation. 
The estimation results in this subsection indicate that China’s financial market is imperfect 
and that the imperfections result in two differences between the state and nonstate sectors in terms of 
their fixed asset investment behavior. Interest expenses affect investment positively in the state 
                                                     
4
 The “Statistical Yearbook of the Chinese Investment in Fixed Assets” provides a more detailed 
classification of ownership status for the registration of fixed assets. For example, it separates 
investments according to state ownership, collective ownership, cooperatives, joint ownership, 
limited shareholding liability, private ownership, and other categories. Therefore, in the fixed capital 
investment regression exercise, we can directly estimate the private owned firms’ investments. 
However, we do not have interest expense information for private firms, and thus we merge the 
interest expenses of the firms in the “other ownership” sector to conduct this regression for the 
private-owned units. 
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sector and negatively in the nonstate sector, indicating that not only does the nonstate sector find it 
difficult to obtain finance from the banking sector, but also that its rental cost is higher than that of 
the state sector. Instead of bank loans, self-raised funds are the critical source of investment finance 
for the nonstate sector. This result reconfirms the importance of internal reserves for the nonstate 
sector in China, in line with the results of the existing research, based on both macro and micro 
evidence. 
 
5.3.The interrelationship between wage determination and fixed asset investment 
In this subsection, we investigate the interrelationship between wage determination and fixed 
asset investment in the imperfect Chinese financial market. In perfectly competitive factor markets, 
entrepreneurs optimally choose their levels of fixed capital and labor, taking the factor prices as 
given. As mentioned above, many previous studies have pointed out the existence of imperfections 
in the capital and labor markets in China. One of the characteristics of the financial market 
imperfections is that although the state-owned sector has easy access to cheap loans, the 
nonstate-owned sector is treated differently, such that obtaining finance is difficult and lending costs 
are high. In addition, China’s labor market is far from completely competitive and the existing 
literature strongly indicates that underpayment of wages occurs, particularly in the private sector. In 
part, this underpayment of wages can be attributed to the poor bargaining power of employees in the 
imperfect labor market and the lack of protection for the basic rights of workers. However, a key 
question is whether there are any other factors explaining the underpayment of wages. Although 
private companies cannot obtain sufficient loans in an imperfect financial market, capital investment 
remains indispensable for continuing in business. If the labor market is imperfect, private 
entrepreneurs may reduce wages so that they can generate more internal funds for capital investment. 
Thus, in China, the state-owned sector enjoys easy access to financial loans in the financial market 
and is not under pressure to generate internal funds by reducing employee wage levels for business 
expansion. Conversely, the nonstate-owned sector is discriminated against in the financial market 
and finds it difficult to obtain finance. Thus, it has a motivation to keep wages lower to generate 
capital investment for business survival. 
In line with these ideas, we estimate a new model, adding a wage fluctuation—based on the 
previous wage growth—into the fixed capital investment equation. The state-owned enterprises are 
not confronted with capital investment financing constraints, and wage growth is considered to have 
a positive correlation with capital investment growth. However, in the nonstate-owned sector, the 
growth rate of wages is considered to be irrelevant to the growth of capital investment, because 
enterprises restrain the level of wages when they face borrowing constraints. Furthermore, if the 
degree of borrowing restrictions is very strong, wages will be reduced even further to enable firms to 
survive, and a negative correlation between wage growth rate and capital investment growth may be 
14 
 
observed. 
Table 4-1 shows the results of the fixed effects model for the fixed asset investment equation, 
including interest expenses and previous wage growth. The wage growth in the state sector is 
significant and positive when estimated using both the level and growth variables. However, we do 
not find this result for the collective, “other ownership”, and private sectors5. Interest expenses 
remain significant and positive in the state sector and significantly negative in the “other ownership” 
sector, even after controlling for previous wage growth. Further, the size of the estimated coefficients 
is almost the same. 
Next, we substitute interest expenses with self-raised funds as our financial indicator (Table 
4-2). In this fixed effects model, the coefficient of previous wage growth is significantly positive in 
the state sector, but not in the collective, “other ownership”, and private sectors. On the other hand, 
self-raised funds are an aspect that is significant and positively affects the capital investment only in 
the nonstate sector. This confirms the hypothesis that the differences in access to financial markets 
lead to different wage and fixed capital investment decisions in the state and nonstate sectors. 
We also examine the results of the GMM estimation considering the dynamic environment. In 
the interest expense case (Table 4-3), previous wage growth is significantly positive in the system 
GMM for the state sector, but significantly negative in the first-differenced GMM for the “other 
ownership” sector. Interest expense is only significant for the “other ownership” sector, where the 
estimated coefficient is negative and quite high. In the case of self-raised funds (Table 4-4), previous 
wage growth is still significantly positive in the system GMM for the state sector, but there is no 
significant effect in the collective, “other ownership”, and private sectors. Further, the aspect of 
self-raised funds is estimated as significantly positive in the “other ownership” and private sectors in 
the system GMM. Finally, Table 4-5 presents the results with deposits used as the financial indicator. 
Again, in the state sector, the previous wage growth is significant and positive in the system GMM 
estimation. In the collective-owned and private sectors, the coefficients of previous wage growth 
were significant and negative. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine how wage decisions and fixed asset investments are determined 
under the imperfect financial market in China. Further, we investigate the interrelationship between 
wage determination and fixed asset investments in such circumstances. 
Although the rise in financial market maturity has led to rising wage levels for state-owned 
                                                     
5
 As average data for private units are available from 2009 onwards, we substitute the other sector 
average data for private wage data and run the regression again for the interval 2009–2015 as a 
robustness check. The estimated parameters on previous wage growth are consistent with the former 
regression. These results are available upon request. 
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enterprises, this phenomenon is not observed in the nonstate sector. In the nonstate sector, there is a 
strong reliance on internal reserves for capital investment that is not observed in the state-owned 
sector, suggesting that the two sectors are treated differently in the financial market. In the 
state-owned sector, previous wage growth is positively correlated with fixed assets investments, 
whereas this relationship is not observed in the nonstate-owned sector. This implies that the 
underpayment of wages may be used as a survival strategy in the nonstate-owned sector by 
businesses under financial constraints. 
The results of this study have important policy implications. Labor market reform is 
indispensable for protecting the basic rights of employees and ensuring wages rise to an appropriate 
level. However, further improvement of the financial market is also essential. There is an urgent 
need to reduce funding costs, especially by promoting loans to the private sector, which would allow 
entrepreneurs to pay adequate wages to their employees. The construction and deepening of 
complete financial and labor markets are indispensable factors for ensuring the efficient growth of 
the Chinese economy. 
There are several tasks required in future research. In this paper, we used aggregate provincial 
data. In future, an investigation based on micro-level data, especially firm-level data, is important. In 
addition, it would be interesting to examine our hypothesis using industry-level data, to determine 
whether there are different reactions between capital- and labor-intensive industries. Finally, we 
require a suitable theoretical framework to explain the optimal entrepreneurial behavior in imperfect 
financial markets and capture the interrelationship between wage determination and fixed asset 
investments. 
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Figure 1. Sources of funds for investment in fixed assets in China. The data indicate the share of 
each source as a proportion of total funds. Source: China Statistical Yearbooks. 
 
 
Figure 2. GDP using the expenditure approach. Data indicate the share of each element in GDP. 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks. 
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Figure 3. Fixed capital investment by state and nonstate sectors. Source: Statistical Yearbook of the 
Chinese Investment in Fixed Assets. The 2013 data is collected from the China Statistical Yearbook 
(2014), in which the coverage of ownership is different from the Statistical Yearbook of the Chinese 
Investment in Fixed Assets. 
 
 
Figure 4. Employment share by ownership in urban units. Source: China Statistical Yearbooks. 
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Figure 5. Compensation of employees as a proportion of GDP. Sources: China Statistical Yearbooks. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Average real wage of employed persons in urban units. The real wage is obtained by 
deflating the nominal wage by the consumer price index, using 1994 as the base year. Source: China 
Labor Statistics Yearbooks. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (2005–2015) 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log real fixed asset investment 341 3.781 1.039 0.486 5.811 341 2.672 0.810 0.260 4.208
Interest expense/sales value of industry 341 0.015 0.008 0.004 0.047 341 0.021 0.012 0.000 0.096
Log real wage 341 5.639 0.383 4.842 6.713 341 5.722 0.408 4.884 6.764
Previous wage growth 341 0.098 0.040 –0.079 0.352 341 0.099 0.045 –0.032 0.361
Total profit/sales value of industry (Profit) 341 0.075 0.036 –0.013 0.237 341 0.072 0.052 –0.186 0.291
Log (real fixed assets/number of enterprise units) (Fixed Assets) 341 –5.025 0.649 –6.458 –3.244 341 –3.242 0.538 –5.756 –2.011
Total liabilities/total assets (Liabilities) 341 0.577 0.070 0.229 0.760 341 0.597 0.088 0.182 0.765
Log real fixed asset investment 341 0.062 1.593 –4.458 3.128 341 3.309 1.215 –0.042 5.593
Interest expense/sales value of industry 322 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.036 340 0.009 0.005 –0.017 0.028
Log real wage 341 5.283 0.445 4.309 6.177 341 5.568 0.393 4.725 6.713
Previous wage growth 341 0.118 0.072 –0.173 0.519 341 0.100 0.101 –1.176 1.074
Total profit/sales value of industry (Profit) 334 0.061 0.045 –0.241 0.229 341 0.070 0.057 0.004 0.482
Log (real fixed assets/number of enterprise units) (Fixed Assets) 275 –6.875 0.642 –8.374 –4.494 341 –6.468 0.605 –7.584 –4.628
Total liabilities/total assets (Liabilities) 337 0.580 0.148 0.235 1.411 341 0.546 0.096 0.122 0.784
Financial market development status indicators
Self-raised funds/total of sources of funds (Self-raised) 341 0.598 0.142 0.183 0.876
Total deposits/GDP (Deposits) 341 1.632 0.712 0.822 5.587
Total loans/GDP (Loans) 341 1.122 0.398 0.553 2.648
Total State-owned Units
Collective–owned Units Other Ownership Units
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Table 2-1 The effects of financial development on wage determination (Fixed-effect estimation): Interest payment. 
Wage Δ State Δ Collective Δ Other Δ
Interest –1.987 1.146 –6.346 –3.714
(1.811) (1.177) (4.346) (2.516)
ΔInterest 3.572 3.017* –2.279 0.054
(2.814) (1.581) (2.253) (1.833)
Constant 4.673*** 0.124*** 5.125*** 0.118*** 4.511*** 0.128*** 5.056*** 0.126***
(0.202) (0.005) (0.178) (0.008) (0.311) (0.008) (0.263) (0.009)
Observations 341 310 341 310 264 203 340 308
R–squared 0.974 0.292 0.965 0.403 0.943 0.149 0.967 0.190
Number of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
 
The fixed effect estimation includes year dummies. Only the main estimated results of the parameters of interest are reported. Wage indicates the total log 
average real wage. State, collective, and other in the column headings indicate the real average wages of state-owned units, collective-owned units, and 
other ownership units, respectively. The symbol ∆ indicates the first log difference. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, 
and * denote that p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. 
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Table 2-2 The effects of financial development on wage determination (GMM estimation): Interest payment. 
DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS
Previous term 0.986*** 1.049*** 0.900*** 1.050*** 0.683** 0.898*** 0.816*** 0.879***
(0.138) (0.082) (0.234) (0.059) (0.250) (0.150) (0.194) (0.132)
Interest 9.181 –0.920 6.526* 2.549 –1.727 –3.578 5.047 2.754
(9.131) (3.182) (3.640) (2.289) (3.567) (4.464) (3.892) (2.986)
Constant 0.000 –0.412 0.563 0.396
(0.000) (0.427) (0.817) (0.683)
Observations 279 310 279 310 173 234 277 309
Number of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Instruments 24 30 24 30 21 28 24 30
ar1p 0.015 0.134 0.003 0.057 0.034 0.002 0.028 0.007
ar2p 0.679 0.123 0.327 0.289 0.997 0.720 0.339 0.386
hansenp 0.141 0.177 0.128 0.179 0.046 0.521 0.274 0.308
A (p–value) 0.212 0.099 0.657 0.274
B (p–value) 0.299 0.320 0.869 0.273
OtherCollectiveStateWage
 
DIF and SYS denote the first-differenced GMM and the system GMM, respectively. There is a limit of three lags for every explanatory variable and we use 
a collapse technique to avoid the “too many instruments” problem. Only the main estimated results of the parameters of interest are reported. Ar1p and ar2p 
are the p-values of a test for first and second-order serial correlation. Hansenp is the p-value for Hansen’s overidentification restrictions test. In the last two 
rows, A (p-value) and B (p-value) represent the p-values of the difference-in-Hansen test for system GMM instruments and a difference-in-Hansen test for 
instruments based on lagged growth, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote that p < 0.01, p < 
0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. 
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Table 2-3 The effects of financial development on wage determination after 2007 (GMM estimation): Deposits and loans. 
 
DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS
Previous term 1.063*** 0.863*** 0.725*** 0.873*** 0.303 0.660*** 0.886*** 0.873*** 0.978*** 0.890*** 0.766*** 0.892*** 0.276 0.694*** 0.751*** 0.913***
(0.224) (0.056) (0.107) (0.069) (0.340) (0.183) (0.152) (0.106) (0.191) (0.081) (0.098) (0.104) (0.310) (0.169) (0.208) (0.074)
Deposits –0.025 0.067 –0.047 0.059* –0.193 –0.004 0.014 –0.020
(0.064) (0.043) (0.054) (0.032) (0.150) (0.034) (0.027) (0.022)
Loans 0.056 0.131* 0.033 0.100*** –0.421** 0.013 –0.237*** –0.041**
(0.140) (0.071) (0.112) (0.032) (0.182) (0.070) (0.059) (0.019)
Constant 0.000 0.000 1.900* 0.422 0.190 0.732 1.751* 0.304
(0.000) (0.000) (0.950) (0.307) (0.693) (0.564) (0.891) (0.281)
Observations 217 248 217 248 120 181 217 248 217 248 217 248 120 181 217 248
Number of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Instruments 22 28 22 28 19 26 22 28 22 28 22 28 19 26 22 28
ar1p 0.105 0.023 0.028 0.006 0.036 0.006 0.004 0.043 0.085 0.052 0.022 0.020 0.088 0.007 0.246 0.033
ar2p 0.622 0.328 0.200 0.164 0.585 0.910 0.031 0.703 0.503 0.395 0.155 0.099 0.715 0.905 0.048 0.304
hansenp 0.490 0.172 0.327 0.402 0.384 0.277 0.073 0.311 0.477 0.395 0.270 0.484 0.342 0.318 0.067 0.414
A (p–value) 0.426 0.513 0.319 0.465 0.538 0.665 0.309 0.594
B (p–value) 0.121 0.698 0.095 0.942 0.344 0.680 0.154 0.942
Collective OtherWage State Collective Other Wage State
 
DIF and SYS denote the first-differenced GMM and the system GMM, respectively. There is a limit of three lags for every explanatory variable and we use 
a collapse technique to avoid the “too many instruments” problem. Only the main estimated results of the parameters of interest are reported. Ar1p and ar2p 
are the p-values of a test for first and second-order serial correlation. Hansenp is the p-value for Hansen’s overidentification restrictions test. In the last two 
rows, A (p-value) and B (p-value) represent the p-values of the difference-in-Hansen test for system GMM instruments and a difference-in-Hansen test for 
instruments based on lagged growth, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote that p < 0.01, p < 
0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. 
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Table 3-1 The impact of financial circumstances on fixed capital investment (Fixed-effect estimation): Interest payment. 
Investment Δ Urban Δ State Δ Collective Δ Other Δ Private Δ
Interest 5.331 9.102 9.431** –12.468 –18.287** –20.470*
(7.045) (6.432) (3.920) (20.123) (8.510) (10.451)
Δinterest –0.682 1.144 0.009 2.809 –14.447* –2.677
(2.351) (2.777) (1.220) (8.916) (7.140) (3.008)
Constant 2.175*** 0.204*** 2.037*** 0.208*** 1.914*** 0.164*** 1.366 –0.887*** 2.584*** 0.265*** 2.899*** 0.440***
(0.548) (0.013) (0.557) (0.014) (0.445) (0.022) (0.807) (0.093) (0.691) (0.039) (0.827) (0.050)
Observations 341 310 341 310 341 310 264 203 340 308 340 308
R–squared 0.938 0.443 0.947 0.293 0.891 0.474 0.505 0.648 0.916 0.569 0.927 0.351
Number of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
 
The fixed effect estimation includes year dummies. Only the main estimated results of the parameters of interest are reported. Investment is the total 
investment by all ownership types in the urban and rural areas of the province. Urban represents the total investment by all ownership types in the urban 
areas of the province. State, collective, other, and private indicate the real fixed capital investment of state-owned units, collective-owned units, other 
ownership units, and private-owned units, respectively. The symbol ∆ denotes the first log difference. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
The symbols ***, **, and * denote that p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. 
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Table 3-2 The impact of financial circumstances on fixed capital investment (Fixed-effect estimation): Self-raised. 
Investment Δ Urban Δ State Δ Collective Δ Other Δ Private Δ
Self–raised 1.227** 1.360** 0.573 3.657*** 1.473*** 2.096**
(0.587) (0.596) (0.724) (1.284) (0.524) (0.876)
ΔSelf–raised 0.230 0.343 –0.178 0.494 0.658* 0.878***
(0.217) (0.291) (0.260) (1.128) (0.385) (0.260)
Constant 1.810*** 0.202*** 1.685*** 0.204*** 1.849*** 0.167*** –0.679 –0.887*** 1.735*** 0.299*** 2.128*** 0.435***
(0.464) (0.012) (0.461) (0.014) (0.522) (0.022) (0.854) (0.094) (0.263) (0.043) (0.747) (0.049)
Observations 341 310 341 310 341 310 273 212 310 310 341 310
R–squared 0.943 0.449 0.952 0.309 0.885 0.475 0.554 0.608 0.907 0.559 0.932 0.374
Number of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
The fixed effect estimation includes year dummies. Only the main estimated results of the parameters of interest are reported. Wage indicates the total log 
average real wage. State, collective, and other in the column headings indicate the real average wages of state-owned units, collective-owned units, and 
other ownership units, respectively. The symbol ∆ indicates the first log difference. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, 
and * denote that p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. 
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Table 3-3 The impact of financial circumstances on fixed capital investment (GMM estimation): Interest payment. 
 
DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS
Previous term 1.054*** 1.049*** 1.100*** 1.119*** 1.089*** 1.023*** 0.116 1.040*** 0.285 0.995*** 0.542** 1.010***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.138) (0.121) (0.104) (0.046) (0.165) (0.151) (0.482) (0.111) (0.229) (0.031)
Interest –3.702 –10.239 –4.732 –6.834 –0.534 3.010 0.440 1.113 –9.114 –17.100 –26.288** –24.362
(7.299) (6.408) (8.384) (6.644) (4.354) (2.238) (16.278) (30.472) (14.660) (14.450) (12.092) (18.024)
Constant 0.000 0.542 0.323 0.000 –0.807 0.639
(0.000) (0.443) (0.303) (0.000) (0.583) (0.729)
Observations 279 310 279 310 279 310 173 234 277 309 277 309
Number of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Instruments 24 30 24 30 24 30 21 28 24 30 24 30
ar1p 0.016 0.015 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.282 0.027 0.012 0.137 0.071 0.001
ar2p 0.946 0.890 0.599 0.732 0.404 0.514 0.939 0.828 0.060 0.171 0.432 0.822
hansenp 0.114 0.093 0.184 0.106 0.553 0.389 0.316 0.105 0.081 0.243 0.227 0.086
A (p–value) 0.387 0.349 0.652 0.291 0.404 0.786
B (p–value) 0.234 0.163 0.231 0.096 0.467 0.270
PrivateInvestment Urban State Collective Other
 
 
DIF and SYS denote the first-differenced GMM and the system GMM, respectively. There is a limit of three lags for every explanatory variable and we use 
a collapse technique to avoid the “too many instruments” problem. Only the main estimated results of the parameters of interest are reported. Ar1p and ar2p 
are the p-values of a test for first and second-order serial correlation. Hansenp is the p-value for Hansen’s overidentification restrictions test. In the last two 
rows, A (p-value) and B (p-value) represent the p-values of the difference-in-Hansen test for system GMM instruments and a difference-in-Hansen test for 
instruments based on lagged growth, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote that p < 0.01, p < 
0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. 
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Table 3-4 The impact of financial circumstances on fixed capital investment (GMM estimation): Self-raised. 
DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS
Previous term 0.949*** 0.967*** 0.948*** 1.007*** 1.063*** 0.904*** 0.350 1.044*** 0.306 0.846*** 0.800*** 0.919***
(0.078) (0.050) (0.087) (0.058) (0.103) (0.076) (0.254) (0.088) (0.210) (0.105) (0.177) (0.131)
Self–raised 0.772* 0.395*** 0.546 0.332** –1.437* 0.048 1.126 0.204 1.167 0.583* 2.921** 0.751
(0.454) (0.119) (0.469) (0.131) (0.831) (0.231) (2.333) (0.502) (0.913) (0.296) (1.417) (0.645)
Constant 0.117 0.240 0.469* 0.000 –0.414 0.000
(0.167) (0.259) (0.241) (0.000) (0.818) (0.000)
Observations 310 341 310 341 310 341 212 273 310 341 310 341
Number of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Instruments 25 31 25 31 25 31 22 29 25 31 25 31
ar1p 0.016 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.312 0.007 0.052 0.106 0.019 0.000
ar2p 0.746 0.978 0.347 0.535 0.671 0.521 0.998 0.597 0.098 0.141 0.437 0.160
hansenp 0.064 0.077 0.084 0.041 0.143 0.044 0.105 0.256 0.025 0.049 0.095 0.128
A (p–value) 0.289 0.115 0.490 0.385 0.083 0.235
B (p–value) 0.445 0.197 0.160 0.854 0.818 0.281
PrivateInvestment Urban State Collective Other
DIF and SYS denote the first-differenced GMM and the system GMM, respectively. There is a limit of three lags for every explanatory variable and we use 
a collapse technique to avoid the “too many instruments” problem. Only the main estimated results of the parameters of interest are reported. Ar1p and ar2p 
are the p-values of a test for first and second-order serial correlation. Hansenp is the p-value for Hansen’s overidentification restrictions test. In the last two 
rows, A (p-value) and B (p-value) represent the p-values of the difference-in-Hansen test for system GMM instruments and a difference-in-Hansen test for 
instruments based on lagged growth, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote that p < 0.01, p < 
0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. 
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Table 4-1 The interrelationship between wage determination and fixed asset investment (Fixed-effect estimation): Interest payment. 
 
Investment Δ Urban Δ State Δ Collective Δ Other Δ Private Δ
Previous Δwage 0.353 0.227 0.459* 0.284** 0.974*** 0.521*** –0.076 0.096 0.084 0.089 –0.143 0.085
(0.261) (0.162) (0.247) (0.123) (0.349) (0.173) (0.497) (0.539) (0.138) (0.099) (0.326) (0.169)
Interest 5.302 9.064 9.529** –12.707 –19.015* 2.117
(7.005) (6.373) (3.912) (19.519) (9.780) (14.161)
Δinterest –0.376 1.528 0.122 2.754 –14.974** 0.315
(2.306) (2.806) (1.130) (8.781) (6.957) (5.189)
Constant 2.078*** 0.178*** 1.911*** 0.175*** 1.670*** 0.108*** 1.365 –0.899*** 2.586*** 0.257*** 3.867*** 0.088***
(0.568) (0.022) (0.585) (0.016) (0.442) (0.025) (0.805) (0.123) (0.693) (0.038) (0.801) (0.026)
Observations 341 310 341 310 341 310 264 203 340 308 150 150
R–squared 0.939 0.450 0.948 0.305 0.895 0.491 0.505 0.648 0.916 0.570 0.903 0.327
Number of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 30 30
 
The fixed effect estimation includes year dummies. Only the main estimated results of the parameters of interest are reported. Wage indicates the total log 
average real wage. State, collective, and other in the column headings indicate the real average wages of state-owned units, collective-owned units, and 
other ownership units, respectively. The symbol ∆ indicates the first log difference. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, 
and * denote that p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. 
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Table 4-2 The interrelationship between wage determination and fixed asset investment (Fixed-effect estimation): Self-raised. 
 
Investment Δ Urban Δ State Δ Collective Δ Other Δ Private Δ
Previous Δwage 0.460 0.244 0.580** 0.300** 1.002** 0.512*** 0.266 0.010 0.029 0.035 –0.076 0.142
(0.275) (0.163) (0.254) (0.124) (0.369) (0.177) (0.433) (0.442) (0.096) (0.106) (0.258) (0.171)
Self–raised 1.258** 1.400** 0.639 3.638*** 1.803*** 1.718**
(0.591) (0.595) (0.712) (1.271) (0.579) (0.706)
ΔSelf–raised 0.245 0.362 –0.137 0.494 0.734* 0.848**
(0.215) (0.286) (0.249) (1.129) (0.364) (0.393)
Constant 1.672*** 0.174*** 1.511*** 0.169*** 1.564*** 0.111*** –0.684 –0.888*** 1.978*** 0.272*** 2.805*** 0.052
(0.503) (0.021) (0.519) (0.017) (0.558) (0.026) (0.852) (0.116) (0.551) (0.036) (0.773) (0.034)
Observations 341 310 341 310 341 310 273 212 341 310 150 150
R–squared 0.944 0.457 0.953 0.321 0.890 0.492 0.555 0.608 0.918 0.558 0.917 0.353
Number of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 30 30
 
The fixed effect estimation includes year dummies. Only the main estimated results of the parameters of interest are reported. Wage indicates the total log 
average real wage. State, collective, and other in the column headings indicate the real average wages of state-owned units, collective-owned units, and 
other ownership units, respectively. The symbol ∆ indicates the first log difference. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, 
and * denote that p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. 
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Table 4-3 The interrelationship between wage determination and fixed asset investment (GMM estimation): Interest payment. 
 
DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS
Previous term 0.963*** 0.871*** 1.016*** 0.916*** 1.014*** 0.965*** 0.236 1.144*** –0.058 0.854*** 0.860*** 1.065***
(0.122) (0.073) (0.143) (0.067) (0.120) (0.058) (0.292) (0.078) (0.179) (0.171) (0.169) (0.038)
Previous Δwage 0.057 0.278* 0.076 0.307* 0.390 0.522* –0.622 –0.844 –0.890* –0.166 –0.266 –0.310
(0.190) (0.161) (0.208) (0.163) (0.306) (0.267) (0.531) (0.611) (0.510) (0.301) (0.228) (0.375)
Interest –1.984 –3.851 –2.764 –0.734 –0.601 2.897 –5.001 –29.939 –17.422* –48.738* –1.386 –0.333
(7.405) (5.607) (8.601) (4.524) (5.707) (2.144) (17.421) (21.943) (9.926) (25.045) (5.745) (5.915)
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.585 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.452) (0.000) (1.370) (0.000)
Observations 248 279 248 279 248 279 142 203 246 278 246 278
Number of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 31 30 31 31 31 31 31
Instruments 26 33 26 33 26 33 23 31 26 33 26 33
ar1p 0.023 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.367 0.017 0.085 0.137 0.013 0.002
ar2p 0.908 0.994 0.482 0.712 0.731 0.774 0.466 0.515 0.722 0.093 0.469 0.545
hansenp 0.095 0.126 0.122 0.136 0.112 0.488 0.209 0.169 0.012 0.390 0.103 0.183
A (p–value) 0.513 0.652 0.980 0.054 0.890 0.516
B (p–value) 0.477 0.471 0.993 0.181 0.919 0.821
PrivateInvestment Urban State Collective Other
 
DIF and SYS denote the first-differenced GMM and the system GMM, respectively. There is a limit of three lags for every explanatory variable and we use 
a collapse technique to avoid the “too many instruments” problem. Only the main estimated results of the parameters of interest are reported. Ar1p and ar2p 
are the p-values of a test for first and second-order serial correlation. Hansenp is the p-value for Hansen’s overidentification restrictions test. In the last two 
rows, A (p-value) and B (p-value) represent the p-values of the difference-in-Hansen test for system GMM instruments and a difference-in-Hansen test for 
instruments based on lagged growth, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote that p < 0.01, p < 
0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. 
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Table 4-4 The interrelationship between wage determination and fixed asset investment (GMM estimation): Self-raised. 
DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS
Previous term 0.944*** 0.959*** 0.944*** 0.983*** 1.050*** 0.887*** 0.387* 1.033*** 0.321 0.838*** 0.930*** 0.805***
(0.074) (0.047) (0.085) (0.055) (0.094) (0.064) (0.212) (0.084) (0.215) (0.104) (0.234) (0.080)
Previous Δwage 0.049 0.275 0.050 0.333* 0.222 0.592** –0.617 –0.599 –0.160 0.039 –0.146 –0.214
(0.168) (0.193) (0.190) (0.173) (0.258) (0.263) (0.570) (0.366) (0.094) (0.085) (0.307) (0.217)
Self–raised 0.534 0.364*** 0.375 0.330*** –1.131 0.104 0.750 0.051 0.538 0.649** –0.116 1.669**
(0.479) (0.106) (0.528) (0.119) (0.753) (0.207) (2.481) (0.525) (0.992) (0.256) (1.462) (0.780)
Constant 0.000 0.080 0.000 1.712 –0.426 –1.150
(0.000) (0.268) (0.000) (1.881) (0.929) (0.943)
Observations 310 341 310 341 310 341 212 273 310 341 120 150
Number of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 30 30
Instruments 28 35 28 35 28 35 25 33 28 35 22 29
ar1p 0.010 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.263 0.014 0.065 0.106 0.022 0.066
ar2p 0.545 0.740 0.258 0.450 0.559 0.542 0.563 0.438 0.119 0.136 0.524 0.529
hansenp 0.065 0.154 0.114 0.147 0.284 0.128 0.141 0.507 0.087 0.162 0.109 0.114
A (p–value) 0.871 0.439 0.468 0.535 0.264 0.160
B (p–value) 0.865 0.552 0.161 0.996 0.938 0.229
PrivateInvestment Urban State Collective Other
 
DIF and SYS denote the first-differenced GMM and the system GMM, respectively. There is a limit of three lags for every explanatory variable and we use 
a collapse technique to avoid the “too many instruments” problem. Only the main estimated results of the parameters of interest are reported. Ar1p and ar2p 
are the p-values of a test for first and second-order serial correlation. Hansenp is the p-value for Hansen’s overidentification restrictions test. In the last two 
rows, A (p-value) and B (p-value) represent the p-values of the difference-in-Hansen test for system GMM instruments and a difference-in-Hansen test for 
instruments based on lagged growth, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote that p < 0.01, p < 
0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. 
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Table 4-5 The interrelationship between wage determination and fixed asset investment (GMM estimation): Deposits. 
DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS
Previous term 0.858*** 0.924*** 1.012*** 0.868*** 0.214 0.985*** –0.293 0.929*** 0.640*** 1.009***
(0.168) (0.042) (0.140) (0.065) (0.294) (0.063) (0.203) (0.139) (0.180) (0.041)
Previous Δwage –0.095 0.160 0.435 0.516** –1.715** –0.614 –0.133 0.001 –0.559*** –0.575***
(0.187) (0.152) (0.301) (0.217) (0.800) (0.470) (0.164) (0.084) (0.109) (0.062)
Deposits –0.155 –0.071** 0.084 –0.076** 1.302 –0.054 –1.309*** –0.077 –0.291 –0.144**
(0.281) (0.028) (0.122) (0.034) (0.957) (0.078) (0.427) (0.125) (0.359) (0.058)
Constant 0.187 0.744* 0.000 1.065 –1.058
(0.242) (0.373) (0.000) (1.045) (0.638)
Observations 310 372 310 372 212 304 310 372 310 372
Number of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Instruments 28 36 28 36 25 34 28 36 28 36
ar1p 0.053 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.558 0.008 0.335 0.101 0.002 0.000
ar2p 0.672 0.795 0.228 0.343 0.556 0.511 0.418 0.127 0.472 0.363
hansenp 0.022 0.137 0.071 0.358 0.100 0.344 0.447 0.245 0.005 0.275
A (p–value) 0.972 0.991 0.725 0.976 0.772
B (p–value) 1.000 0.925 0.719 0.759 1.000
Investment State Collective Other Private
 
DIF and SYS denote the first-differenced GMM and the system GMM, respectively. There is a limit of three lags for every explanatory variable and we use 
a collapse technique to avoid the “too many instruments” problem. Only the main estimated results of the parameters of interest are reported. Ar1p and ar2p 
are the p-values of a test for first and second-order serial correlation. Hansenp is the p-value for Hansen’s overidentification restrictions test. In the last two 
rows, A (p-value) and B (p-value) represent the p-values of the difference-in-Hansen test for system GMM instruments and a difference-in-Hansen test for 
instruments based on lagged growth, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote that p < 0.01, p < 
0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. 
